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Abstract 
 Commercial banks play a pivotal role in the economy in the intermeadition process by 
mobilizing deposits from surplus units to deficit units. The surplus is channelled to deficit 
units through lending. Lending is the main activity of commercial banks in Kenya. However, 
banks in Kenya have had a high rate of loan default from the borrowers which have caused 
significant losses to the banks. This is because commercial banks have varied credit 
information and credit history about their borrowers and the credit seekers have taken this 
shortfall to get many loans from these banks which increases their rate of default because 
they might fail to service back all the loans. This study was therefore guided by objectives 
that sought to; find out the effects of credit information sharing on nonperforming loans in 
KCB Kenya and specifically to establish the trend of bad loans before and after the 
introduction of CRB, to identify the factors that account for bad loans and to determine the 
economic sector that records higher bad loans and the efforts taken to reduce the risk in this 
sector. Data was collected from primary sources and secondary data was collected from 
published financial statements of KCB between year 2007 to 2012. The researcher adopted a 
descriptive case research design and stratified proportionate random sampling technique was 
used to select the sample and data was analysed using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods and explanation given in prose.  
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Introduction 
Background of the Study 
 Commercial banks play a pivotal role in the economy in the intermediation process by 
mobilizing deposits from surplus units to deficit units. The surplus is channelled to deficit 
units through lending. Lending is one of the main activities of commercial banks and any 
other financial institutions in Kenya. This is evident by the size of loans that form banks 
assets and the annual substantial increase in the amount of credit granted to borrowers in the 
country. Loan portfolio is naturally the largest asset and the largest source of income for 
banks. In view of the significant contribution of loans to the financial health of banks through 
interest income generated, these assets are considered the most important assets of banks. 
Table Loan portfolios compared to total assets of the bank (KCB) (Source Audited Financials of KCB year 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) 
 
As a result of commercial banks and financial institutions business, they expose 
themselves to the risks of default from loan borrowers. Quality credit risk assessment and risk 
management and creation of adequate provisions for bad and doubtful debts can reduce the 
banks credit risk. When the level of nonperforming assets is high, the assets provisions made 
are not adequate protection against default risk.  Banks in Kenya have been lending funds to 
serial defaulters, this is as a result of banks having different credit information regarding the 
borrowers and these borrowers have exploited the information asymmetry to borrow several 
loans from the Kenyan banks and defaulting in the long run thus increasing the level of 
nonperforming assets (NPAs) in the banking sector in Kenya. Due to information asymmetry, 
the Central Bank of Kenya and Kenya Bankers Association came together to initial Credit 
Information Sharing in the Kenya to cap the loop hole exploited by the serial defaulters. 
Credit Information Sharing is a process where banks and other lenders submit information 
about their borrowers to a credit reference bureau so that it can be shared with other credit 
providers. According to bank supervision annual report CBK, 2009 it enables the banks to 
know how borrowers have been repaying their loans. Credit Information Sharing enables the 
banks get access a Credit Report. A Credit Report is a report generated by the Credit 
Reference Bureau (CRB), the Credit Report contains detailed information on a borrower’s 
credit history, the borrower’s identity, credit facilities, bankruptcy and late payments of 
Year Total Assets (000) Total loans (000) Percentage % 
2007 112,210,660 56,477,448 50.33 
2008 174,711,564 79,343,099 45.41 
2009 172,384,128 96,557,588 56.01 
2010 223,024,556 137,344,568 61.58 
2011 282,493,553 179,843,967 63.66 
2012 304,112,307 187,022,664 61.50 
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previous obligations and latest checks made by other prospective lenders. It can be obtained 
by any prospective lender, when they have a valid reason to access the report as stipulated in 
Kenyan banking law, to determine the borrower’s creditworthiness. 
 The economic growth of a country and the development of banking are correlated. 
The banking sector is an indispensable financial service sector supporting development plans 
through channelizing funds for fruitful purpose, mobilizing and controlling flow of funds 
from surplus to deficit units and supporting financial and economic policies of government. 
The success of banking is assessed based on profit and quality of assets it possesses. Even 
though bank serves social objective through its priority sector lending, mass branch networks 
and employment of many people, maintaining quality asset book and continuous profit 
making is important for banks continuous growth. A major threat to banking business is 
nonperforming assets. NPA represent bad loans, the borrowers of which failed to satisfy their 
repayment obligations. Michael et al (2006) emphasized that NPA in loan portfolio affect 
operational efficiency which in turn affects the profits of the bank, liquidity position and 
solvency position of banks. Batra, S (2003) noted that NPA also affect the psychology of 
bankers in respect of their disposition of funds towards credit delivery and credit allocation.  
 The high level of non-performing loans in the banking industry has been a hindrance 
to economic stability. According to CBK bank supervision annual report (April 2009), the 
stock of NPLs expanded by 7.8% to Ksh 64.9 billion by March 31st, 2009 from Ksh 58.3 
billion in 2008. In the year 2006, the NPLS were Kshs. 56.4 billion from Kshs. 68.6 billion in 
2005. (Bank Supervision Annual Report 2006) In 2003 and 2004, the average non-
performing loan to total loans for the industry was 25% and 24% respectively (Market 
Intelligence 2004). NPLs in Kenya stood at Kshs. 107.4 billion at the end of 2001. This 
represented 38% of total loan of Kshs. 281.7 billion in the banking sector. (Oloo, 2003). 
When loans become non-performing, banks liquidity and its earnings are adversely affected. 
This can be compared with levels of NPLs in other countries. 
 According to bank supervision report CBK (2001), comparing the ratio of non-
performing loans in Kenya of 33% to similar African economies as at the end of 2000, the 
ratio is much lower in these countries. For example in Zimbabwe it was (24%), Nigeria it was 
(11%) and South Africa it was (3%) which was the lowest among these African 
economies.According to (Kalani and Waweru, 2009), Kenya has experienced banking 
problems since 1986 culminating in major bank failures (37 failed banks as at 1998) 
following the crises of; 1986 - 1989, 1993/1994 and 1998, the crises were mainly attributed 
to NPLs. According to Mullei (2003), Daima bank was placed under statutory management 
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for failing to meet the minimum core capitalization threshold as well as poor management of 
loan portfolios. As a result of the banking failures in Kenya and to find a way forward to 
prevent further failures, the Credit Information Sharing mechanism was launched in Kenya 
following the legislation and gazette of the Credit Bureau Regulations on 11th July 2007. The 
Credit Bureau Regulations were issued following the amendment to the Banking Act passed 
in 2006 that made it mandatory for the Deposit Protection Fund and institutions licensed 
under the Banking Act to share information on nonperforming loans through credit reference 
bureaus licensed by the Central Bank of Kenya. This was the result of many years of 
negotiations and agreement between Kenya Bankers Association, Central Bank of Kenya, the 
Ministry of Finance and the office of the Attorney General aimed at finding way forward to 
the challenges facing the lending environment in Kenya and especially the banking sector. 
(Bank supervision annual report CBK, 2007). 
Problem Statement 
 Lending is the main business of financial institutions and loans is naturally the main 
asset and the major source of revenue for banks. Despite the huge income created from 
lending, available literature shows that huge shares of banks loans regularly go bad and 
therefore affect the financial performance of these institutions. The issue of bad loans can 
fuel banking crisis and result in the collapse of some of these institutions with their attendant 
repercussions on the economy as a whole. Kane and Rice (2001) stated that at the peak of the 
financial crisis in Benin, 80% of total bank loans portfolio which was about 17% of GDP was 
nonperforming in the late twentieth century. Certainly bad loans can lead to the collapse of 
banks which have huge balances of these nonperforming loans if measures are not taken to 
minimize the problem.  Many borrowers that are potentially good credit risk fail to get 
funding because the lenders cannot objectively establish their credit history due to the 
underlying challenge of information asymmetry. Also, some bad loan borrowers, who know 
that banks operate in isolation, have exploited the information asymmetry to create multiple 
bad debts in the banking industry in Kenya. The operation nature of these loan serial 
defaulters have distorted the lending business in the credit market, adversely affecting bank 
performance, threatening banking sector stability and curtaining growth of the credit to the 
private sector due to the high interest charged on facilities to compensate on the credit risk. 
Therefore, this upsurge of nonperforming loans has caused a spiral effect on the interest 
charged to all borrowers across the market. In addition, the fear of lending to bad debtors has 
led to the tendency by banks to scramble for less risky lending in the form of government 
securities such as treasury bills and treasury bonds.  
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Research Objectives 
 The general objective of the research was to establish the effects of credit information 
sharing on nonperforming loans of Kenya Commercial Bank Limited. The research had the 
following specific research objectives; 
1. To establish the trend of bad loans, before and after the introduction of CRB. 
2. To identify the factors that account for bad loans. 
3. To determine the economic sector that records higher bad loans and the efforts taken 
to reduce the risk in this sector in KCB. 
Research Questions 
 The research was guided by the following research questions; 
1. What was the trend of nonperforming loans before the introduction of CRB? 
2. What factors account for nonperforming loans in Kenya Commercial Bank limited? 
3. Which of the economic sectors are affected by higher nonperforming loans and what 
efforts are being taken to reduce the risk in this sector in KCB? 
Literature review 
Theoretical Framework 
 The theory of asymmetric information indicates that it may be complex to distinguish 
between good and bad borrowers (Auronen, 2003) in Richard (2011), which may result into 
adverse selection and moral hazards problems. The theory expounds that in the market, the 
person that possesses more information on a particular item to be transacted (in this case the 
borrower) is in a position to negotiate optimal terms for the transaction than the other party 
(in this case, the lender) (Auronen, 2003) in Richard (2011). The party that knows less about 
the same specific item to be transacted is therefore in a position of making either right or 
wrong decision concerning the transaction. Adverse selection and moral hazards have led to 
significant accumulation of nonperforming loans in banks (Bester, 1994; Bofondi and Gobbi, 
2003). 
Adverse Selection Theory 
 Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that information sharing reduces adverse selection 
by improving banks information on credit applicants. In their mode of doing business, each 
banking institution has private information  about  local  credit  applicants,  but  has  no  
information  about  foreign applicants. If banks exchange information about their clients’ 
credit worth, they can assess also the quality of foreign credit applicants and lend to them as 
carefully as they lend to local customers. By reducing information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers, credit registries allow loans to be extended to safe borrowers who had 
previously been priced out of the market, resulting in higher aggregate lending. The impact of 
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information sharing on aggregate lending in this model is vague. When banks exchange credit 
information about borrowers’ kinds, the increase in lending to good credit borrowers may fail 
to compensate for an eventual reduction in lending to risky types. The  Adverse  selection  
problem  signals  that  when  lenders  cannot  distinguish good  from wicked  borrowers,  all  
borrowers  are  charged  an  normal  interest  rate  that  reflects  their  pooled experience. If 
this rate is higher than worthy borrowers deserve, it will push some good borrowers out of the 
borrowing market, forcing in turn to banks charging even higher rates to the remaining 
borrowers. Through sharing of the credit information, the lender is able to distinguish bad 
borrowers from good borrowers in the market. Better access to information helps lenders 
measure borrower risk more accurately and to set loan terms and conditions accordingly. 
Good borrowers with low risk would be given more attractive prices, stimulating credit 
demand, and fewer higher-risk borrowers would be rationed out of the market because of 
lenders inability to offer these borrowers accommodating rates (Barron and Staten, 2008). 
Padilla and Pagano (2000), show that if banks exchange credit information on defaults, 
borrowers are encouraged to apply more energy in their projects. In both models non-
payment is a sign of bad quality for outside banks and carries the penalty of higher interest 
rates, or no future access to credit facility. 
Moral Hazard Theory 
 The moral hazard problem implies that a borrower has the incentive to default unless 
there are consequences for his future applications for credit. This result from the difficulty 
lenders have in assessing the level of wealth borrowers will have accumulated by the date on 
which the debt must be repaid, and not at the moment of application. If lenders cannot assess 
the borrowers  wealth,  the  latter  will  be  tempted  to  default  on  the borrowing.  
Forestalling  this, lenders  will  increase  rates,  leading  eventually  to  the  breakdown  of  
the  market  Alary  and Goller (2001) 
Conceptual Framework 
 A conceptual framework is a basic structure that consists of certain abstract blocks 
which represent the observational, the experiential and the analytical/ synthetically aspects of 
a process or system being conceived. The interconnection of these blocks completes the 
framework for certain expected outcomes. 
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Figure: Conceptual Framework (Source: Author, 2013) 
Information Asymmetry 
 The Kenyan banking sector was in the 80’s and 90’s weighed down with a 
momentous nonperforming assets portfolio. This habitually led to the end of certain banks. 
One of the promoters in this situation was serial defaulters, who borrowed from a range of 
banks with no purpose of repaying the loans. Certainly these defaulters thrived in the 
“information asymmetry” environment that prevailed due to lack of a credit information 
sharing mechanism. Information asymmetry refers to a situation where business owners or 
managers know more about the scenario, for and risk facing, their business than do lenders. 
Information asymmetry describes the condition in which relevant information is not known to 
all parties involved in an undertaking (Ekumah and Essel, 2003).It has been used extensively 
to explain a diversity of concept, including those in different market condition (Misukin, 
1991). 
 According to Prof. Njuguna Ndung’u, governor Central Bank of Kenya during annual 
address in year  2008, noted that the realization of credit information sharing in the banking 
sector will not only bring good news to the banks and the banking sector but also to the 
borrowers and the economy as a whole. This national success stands to significantly benefit 
the economy and is bound to stir changes in the way credit is managed in the industry in the 
sense that lenders will be in a position to access comprehensive credit data and will be able to 
price risk accordingly for both good and bad borrowers hence reducing their bad debt 
portfolios. 
Interest rates  
 Interest rate is the price a borrower pays for the use of money they borrow from a 
lender/financial institutions or fee paid on borrowed assets, Crowley (2007). Interest can be 
thought of as "rent of money". Interest rates are fundamental to a ‘capitalist society’ and are 
 Information Asymmetry 
 Interest rates  
 Management of loans  
and legal framework 
 Credit Criteria 
Non Performing Loans 
Independent Variable Dependent Variables 
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normally expressed as a percentage rate over one year. Interest rate as a price of money 
indicates market information concerning probable change in the purchasing power of money 
or future inflation (Ngugi, 2001). Financial institutions facilitate mobilization of savings, 
diversification and pooling of risks and allocation of resources (Collins NJ, et al, 2011). 
However, since the receipts for deposits and loans are not harmonized, intermediaries like 
banks incur certain costs (Ngugi, 2001). They charge a price for the intermediation services 
offered under uncertainty and set the interest rate levels for deposits and loans. The disparity 
between the gross costs of borrowing and the net return on lending defines the intermediary 
costs which include information costs, transaction costs, administration, default costs and 
operational costs (Rhyne, 2002). Interest rate spread is well-defined by market microstructure 
characteristics of the banking sector and the policy environment (Ngugi, 2001).  
 Independent studies (Chand, 2002 and Asian Development Bank, 2001), have listed 
the several reasons for high interest rate spread. These are lack of sufficient competition, 
diseconomies of scale due to small size of markets, high operating and fixed costs, high 
transportation cost of funds due to expensive telecommunications, existence of regulatory 
controls and perceived market risks. They further state that the factors mentioned above lead 
to high intermediation costs, which cause high spread. These studies have recognized one of 
the most understandable costs, which is associated with the capacity to enforce debt 
contracts. Small borrowers with no fixed assets rights have no guarantee to offer. As such, 
they are perceived as borrowers with high risk. Because of high transaction costs involved 
such borrowers are charged punitive rates of interest. Further, Chand (2002) singles out 
issues of governance. The latter encompasses maintenance of law and order and provision of 
basic transport and communications, all imposing on security, a lack of which has been found 
to be a cause for high transaction costs resulting in large intermediation costs. When there is 
high intermediation cost, reflected in the high interest rate spread; the borrower may be 
unable to repay his/her loan owing to the cost of such borrowings. This leads to a high risk of 
loan default hence non-performance (Chand, 2002).  
Management of loans and Legal framework 
 An important element of sound credit risk management is analyzing what could 
potentially go wrong with individual credits and the overall credit portfolio if 
conditions/environment in which borrowers operate change radically. The result of this 
analysis should then be factored into the assessment of the adequacy of provisioning and 
capital of the organization. Such stress analysis can disclose earlier undetected areas of 
potential credit risk exposure that could arise in times of crisis. Possible scenarios that 
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banking institutions should consider in carrying out stress testing include: significant 
economic or industry sector downturns; adverse market-risk events; and unfavourable 
liquidity conditions (Diana, 1997).  
 Ranjan and Dhal (2003) opined that horizon of development of credit, better credit 
culture, positive macroeconomic and business conditions lead to lowering of NPAs. In its 
annual report (2010) CBK noted that management of NPA by banks remains an area of 
concern, particularly, due to the likelihood of worsening of the quality of restructured loans. 
The nonperforming loans of banks are an important criterion to assess the financial health of 
banking sector. It reflects the asset worth, credit risk and competence in the allocation of 
resources to the productive sectors. Ahmed (2010) noted that since the reform regime there 
has been various initiatives to contain growth of NPA to improve the asset quality of the 
banking sector. Commercial banks have envisaged the greatest renovation in their operation 
with the introduction of new concepts like prudential accounting norms, income recognition 
and capital adequacy ratio which have placed them in new platform. The growing 
competition from internal and external constituents and sluggish growth in economy coupled 
with poor credit-deposit ratio, the large volume of NPAs in the balance sheet and lack of 
automation and professionalization in the operation have been affecting the banking situation 
in the country. 
Credit criteria 
 Credit criteria are factors used to determine a credit seeker’s creditworthiness or 
ability to repay debt. The factors include income, amount of existing personal debt, number 
of accounts from other credit sources and credit history. Swaren (1990) suggested that the 
most pervasive area of risk is an overly aggressive lending exercise. It is a hazardous practice 
to extend lending term beyond the useful life of the corresponding collateral. Besides that, 
giving out loans to borrowers who are already overloaded with debt or possess unfavourable 
credit history can expose banks to unnecessary default and credit risk. In order to decrease 
these risks, banks need to take into consideration several common applicants’ particulars such 
as debt to income ratio, business and credit history and performance record and for individual 
loan applicants their time on the job or length of time. 
 Credit risk management is a process, a comprehensive system. The process that 
begins with identifying the lending markets, often referred to as “target markets” and 
proceeds through a series of stages to loan repayment. Banking institutions face intense 
challenges in managing credit risk. Government controls, internal and external political 
interferences and pressures, production difficulties, financial limitations, market disruptions, 
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delays in production schedules and frequent instability in the business environment 
undermine the financial condition of borrowers. Furthermore, financial information is 
frequently unreliable and legal framework does not always support debt recovery; (Mueller, 
1988). Some writers also hold the view that bad loans can be caused by problem accounts. 
Rouse (1989) indicated in his work that problem loans can emanate from overdrawn account 
where there is no overdraft limit overdraft taken on an account which has not been actively 
operated for some time and overdraft taken in excess of reasonable functioning limits. Also 
he identified lack of technical good skills and judgement on the part of the lender is a 
possible cause of bad loans. 
Empirical literature review  
 According to Akerlof (1970), adverse selection implies that there are qualitatively 
different types of credit seekers. In contrast with high quality borrowers, low quality 
borrowers are not capable to use the borrowed money for valuable investment and they will 
have a relatively large chance to fail on payment of the loan. Banks consequently prefer to 
select high quality credit seekers and the major way of examining a potential borrower is by 
analyzing all available information, Leland and Pule (1977). The selection challenge results 
from the behaviour of low quality applicant that presumes to submit high quality project but 
do not forward all relevant negative information. 
 In the adverse selection model developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993), information 
sharing improves the pool of borrowers, reduces defaults and decreases interest rates. It can 
also lead to growth of lending. When banks are local monopolists, however, in some cases 
lending reduces, because the exchange of credit information increases the banks’ possibility 
of price discrimination between safe and risky borrowers and the increase in lending to safe 
borrowers does not fully compensate for the reduction in that too risky types. When credit 
markets are competitive, lending activity is more likely to increase: competition limits the 
banks’ ability to charge more interest from their customers and information sharing increases 
banking competition. 
 As per Pauly (1968), if the concept of moral hazard is applied to a lending and 
borrowing circumstance, it means that the customer to whom a loan has been extended 
controls the money of the lending institution. In such instances, the customer may use the 
money for his own interest and not consider the percentage stake of the bank. Banks thus try 
to monitor their customers as all principals do with their agents. Monitoring however requires 
some guarantees that proper information will be provided. Moral hazard models also imply 
that information sharing should reduce default rates and interest rates and increase lending of 
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money, either because credit reference bureaus nurture competition by reducing 
informational rents, Padilla and Pagano (1996) or because they punish borrowers (Padilla and 
Pagano, 1997). In severe cases, information exchange may make lending feasible in markets 
where no credit would be extended otherwise. In these models, whenever banks choose to 
communicate they bring about a Pareto improvement by raising customers’ welfare along 
with their own profits. Padilla and Pagano (1997) point out that the disciplinary effect of 
credit bureaus arises only from the exchange of negative information. Credit information 
about past defaults generates fear of social stigma. Sharing white information, i.e. statistics 
on borrowers’ characteristics, while attenuating adverse selection effects, may actually 
decrease the disciplinary effect of credit information sharing. Consequently, the reasonable 
benefit of sharing black and white information depends on the relative importance of moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems in the market. 
 According to Jared Getenga (2007), one of the features that banks deliberate when 
deciding on a loan credit application is the estimated chances of recovery. To arrive at this, 
credit information is required on how well the applicant has honoured past loan obligations. 
This credit information is important because there is usually a definite relationship between 
past and future performance in loan repayment. Very often, this history is not within the 
bank’s reach because the potential borrower’s repayment records are scattered in the various 
archives of the other financial institutions where the customer has previously borrowed. 
Whenever a borrower has credit information that the lender cannot access, this is officially 
referred to as information asymmetry. Kalberg and Udell (2003) also point out that 
information exchange from multiple sources improves the precision of the signal about the 
quality of the credit seeker. As a result, the default rate reduces. In contrast, the effect on 
lending is vague, because when banks exchange credit information about borrowers’ 
categories, the implied increase in lending to good borrowers may fail to compensate for the 
reduction in lending to risky borrowers. Banking competition for borrowers strengthens the 
positive effect of information sharing on lending: when credit markets are competitive, 
information sharing reduces informational interest charged and increases banking 
competition, which in turn leads to increased lending. Information sharing can also create 
incentives for borrowers to perform in line with banks’ interests. Klein (1992) shows that 
information sharing can motivate borrowers to pay their loans, when the legal atmosphere 
makes it difficult for banks to implement credit agreements. In this model borrowers repay 
their loans because they know that defaulters will be blacklisted, reducing external finance in 
the near future. 
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 Kenya government recognizes the chronic burden of NPLs in the banking industry. 
For instance, in the budget speech of June 2003, the Minister of Finance indicated that, the 
government was exploring possibilities of setting up a non-performing loan agency with 
judicial powers to deal with the issue of bad debts (Oloo 2003). In the year 2007, government 
introduced the in-duplum rule providing that interest on NPLs be stopped from accruing 
further interest, as soon as the interest already levied equals the principal borrowed (Oloo 
2007). This bill was meant to check further escalation of NPLs. Further, enactment of the 
Finance Act 2006 by parliament, made sharing information on non-performing loans 
compulsory, in an effort to reduce the incidence of non-performance of loans (Banking 
supervision Annual Report 2007). Oloo (2001) traced the genesis of NPLS in Kenya to the 
external environment in which the Kenyan banks operate. He argues that when the 
government was faced by the clamour for, multiparty, it held an election in 1992 for which it 
was ill prepared. Out of desperation, the CBK was compelled to imprudently print money 
ostensibly to fund the elections. The result was a sharp increase in interest rates as the 
government thereafter, sought to clear up excess liquidity. The domestic debt rose from Kshs. 
45 billion in 1992 to Kshs. 166 billion, in 1993. Oloo further comments that the interest rate 
on treasury bills rose from 23% in early 1992 to 76% in 1993. This argument points that 
external environment had an influence on the level at NPLs in the banking industry in Kenya.  
Research Gap 
 A number of studies have been carried out about many aspects of nonperforming 
assets in Kenya. None of them addresses the effect of credit information sharing on 
nonperforming assets of KCB head-on and comprehensively. This study has the following 
objectives: to establish the effects of Credit Reference Bureaus on nonperforming loans, to 
establish the trend of bad loans before and after the introduction of CRB, to identify the 
factors that account for bad loans and to determine the sector that records higher bad loans. 
This study therefore seeks to confront the effect of credit information sharing on 
nonperforming assets of KCB. So far, there has been slim empirical evidence on the effect of 
credit information sharing on nonperforming assets in Kenya. This paper attempted to fill this 
gap and foster research in this important area for credit information sharing. 
Research Methodology 
Introduction 
 This chapter involves an outline for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. 
It identifies the research design, the target population, procedures and techniques that were 
used in the collection, processing and analysis of data. It includes the following subsections; 
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target population, sampling design, project research design data collection procedures, data 
collection instruments and finally data analysis. 
Research Design 
 The study adopted the use of a descriptive case research design. The case study 
approach was preferred by the researcher due to time constrain and also on the availability 
and reliability of data from the Kenya commercial bank which has been in existent since year 
1896. Also the researcher works within the banking sector thus it was easier to collect data 
from the respondents. This descriptive case research was aimed at getting detailed 
information regarding the effects of credit information sharing on nonperforming loans of 
Kenya Commercial Bank Limited. A descriptive study is concerned with finding out the 
what, where and how of a phenomenon (Ngechu, 2004). Descriptive research design was 
chosen because it enabled the researcher to infer the findings to a larger population with high 
level of accuracy. The focus of the study was both quantitative and qualitative in order to 
gain a better understanding and more insightful interpretation of the results. According to 
Coopers and Schindler (2004) descriptive studies are more formalized and typically 
structured with clearly stated hypotheses or investigative questions. 
Target Population 
 The target population comprised of 284 staff in different managerial levels employed 
at Kenya Commercial bank Limited head office where decisions regarding lending are made 
and measured. The population was selected since the people in the head office are the ones 
involved in the day to day lending business for the company and thus are well conversant 
with the subject matter of the study. The target population was categorized as follows: 
Table: Target Population 
Level Total Number of staff 
Top level managers 22 
Middle level managers 46 
Low level managers 216 
Total 284 
 
Sampling Technique 
 From the population frame the required number of respondents were selected in order 
to make a sample. Stratified proportionate random sampling technique was used to select the 
sample. According to Ngechu (2004), stratified proportionate random sampling technique 
produces estimates of overall population parameters with greater precision and ensures a 
more representative sample will be derived from a relatively homogeneous population. 
Stratification aims to reduce standard error by providing some control over variance. The 
study grouped the population into three strata i.e. top, middle and low level managers. From 
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each stratum the study used simple random sampling to select one hundred and sixty six 
respondents who formed the sample size.  
 Yamane (1967) provides a simplified formula to calculate sample sizes.  A 95% 
confidence level and P = .5 are assumed   
n = 
N 
1+N(e)^2 
n = 284 
  ((1+284(0.5)^2)) 
n = 166 
Where n is the sample size of the respondents, N is the population size of the 
respondents and e is the level of precision. 
Table: Sampling Frame 
Level Total Number of staff Number to be sampled 
Top level managers 22 13 
Middle level managers 46 27 
Low level managers 216 126 
Total 284 166 
 
Data Collection 
A questionnaire was the primary tool for collecting data. Kothari (2004) terms the 
questionnaire as the most appropriate instrument due to its ability to collect a large amount of 
information in a reasonably quick span of time and economical manner. It guarantees 
confidentiality of the source of information through anonymity while ensuring 
standardization. In addition all the respondents were educated staff to tertiary/university 
level. It is for the above reasons that the questionnaire was chosen as an appropriate 
instrument for this study. The questionnaire used to collect primary data consisted of open 
and closed ended questions. The open-ended questions were to enable the researcher to 
collect qualitative data. This was used in order to have a better understanding and possibly 
enable a better and more insightful interpretation of the results from the study. To establish 
the validity of the research instrument the researcher sought opinions of experts in the field of 
study especially the researcher’s supervisor. The questionnaire was administered using a drop 
and pick later method. In addition, the researcher engaged the respondents in telephone 
interviews. Secondary data was collected from the company's financial publications from the 
company website. 
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Data Analysis 
 Content analysis was performed based on information from the published financial 
information of KCB. The researcher works within the banking industry and thus the data was 
collected from the reliable staffs who are involved in the day to day lending business of the 
bank. Before processing the responses, the filled questionnaires were edited for consistency 
and completeness. The collected data was then coded to enable the responses to be grouped 
into various categories. Data for this study was both quantitative and qualitative hence both 
descriptive and content analysis techniques were used. Content analysis was employed to 
analyze the qualitative data collected while a descriptive method was used to analyze 
quantitative data. The data was processed in Excel and the processed data was then presented 
in tables, graphs and explanation given in prose.  
Limitations and delimitation of the Study 
 The study was limited to a sample of Kenya commercial bank head office located in 
Nairobi only. The researcher encountered problems of time as the research was taken in a 
short period. However the researcher countered this limitation by carrying out the research 
across all the departments and management levels in the organization to enable inference of 
the study findings. The researcher works within the banking sector in credit risk management 
department and thus understands the operations in the banking industry in Kenya. The 
respondents were staff working in various departments involved directly in lending business 
within KCB. This was useful since they understand credit information sharing and 
nonperforming loans within the bank.  
Presentation of research findings 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents analysis and findings of the study as set out in the research 
methodology. The results are presented on the effects of credit information sharing on the 
level of nonperforming loans of Kenya Commercial Bank Limited. 
Questionnaire response rate and interview success rate  
 Out of the one hundred and fifty three (153) questionnaires sent to the target 
population, one hundred and thirty nine (139) usable responses were collected. This 
represented a response rate of 90.8 percent and implies that 9.2 percent of the questionnaires 
were not returned at all. Of the thirteen projected interviews, only ten were successfully 
contacted, giving a success rate 76.9 percent. Three interviews failed primarily because the 
targeted interviewees were time constrained. Despite this, the target population was fairly 
represented considering that key personnel who are relevant to the study were interviewed. 
The results are shown in table below. 
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Table: Questionnaire and interview success rate 
Instruments Target respondents Successful Success rate (%) 
Questionnaires 153 139 90.8 
Interviews 13 10 76.9 
Total 166 149 89.8 
 
The statistics in Table above gives a fair representation of the target population and 
hence the validity of data. 
Gender 
 From the analysis, it occurred that, many respondents were male (85) representing 
57% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study and female (64) representing 
43% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study as shown in Table 4.2 
below. This implies that, Women are beginning to get a number of significant appointments 
in the corporate sector. Most of them have qualifications that rival men and this is in 
fulfillment of the new constitution. KCB, which has remained gender sensitive, seems to be 
giving women and men equal opportunities for appointment to its various positions. 
Academic Qualification (Respondents) 
 Respondents from KCB who have a degree certificate were 97 representing 65.1% of 
the respondents from KCB who participated in the study while those with postgraduate 
degrees were 52 representing 34.9% of the respondents from KCB. This implies a highly 
learnt and qualified individual’s for the job categories they hold. This further explains why 
there is plenty of human resource within our country. From the findings, the number of those 
with degrees and above corresponds to the increased knowledge among the staff of the bank. 
Indicating that other than, educational qualification, the other reasons for no payment of loans 
could be other beyond the normal staff level, meaning that, it could be only the Central bank 
and top management of the bank that could address the non-payment of loans. 
Number of years worked with the bank 
 Most of the bank employees who participated in the study have been with the KCB 
for a long time. From the findings, majority of them, have been with the bank for over 8 years 
(36) representing 24.2% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study, 
followed by those that have stayed 2-4 years (35) 23.5% of the respondents from KCB who 
participated in the study and those who have stayed for between 4-6 years (33) representing 
22.1% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study.  This implies that, 
majority of the employees of the bank have not changed jobs so often hence they have been 
with the bank for quite some time. An indication that, they understand their work well and 
any recommendation they give is accurate and they can be relied on. The last groups were 
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those that have stayed for between 7-8 years old and less than 2 years old as shown in table 
below. 
Table: Number of years worked with the KCB 
Number of years Respondents Percentage (%) of the 
respondents 
Less than 2 years 21 14.1 
3-4 years 35 23.5 
5-6 years 33 22.1 
7-8 years 24 16.1 
9 years and above 36 24.2 
Total 149 100 
Source:  Primary data computed in Excel 
 
Department Affiliation 
Most of the respondents were from the SME department (40) representing 26.8% of 
the total respondents from KCB who participated in the study, followed by Asset Finance 
(37) representing 24.8% of the total respondents from KCB who participated in the study, 
then Credit Risk Management (32) representing 21.5% of the total respondents from KCB 
who participated in the study, then corporate (24) representing 16.1% of the total respondents 
and lastly Retail (16) representing 10.7% of the total respondents from KCB who participated 
in the study. This indicates that respondents were drawn from all departments of the bank as 
shown in table below. 
Table: Department Affiliation 
Department No of respondents (Frequency) Percentage (%) of 
the respondents 
SME 40 26.8 
Asset Finance 37 24.8 
Credit Risk Management 32 21.5 
Corporate 24 16.1 
Retail 16 10.7 
Total 149 100 
Source:  Primary data computed in Excel 
 
Effect of Sharing Credit Information 
74 of the respondents representing 50% of the respondents from KCB who 
participated in the study were in agreement that, the savings that will arise from sharing of 
credit information shall translate to low cost of credit, 66 respondents representing 44% of the 
respondents from KCB who participated in the study strongly agreed and then lastly, 9 
respondents representing 6% of them were uncertain. This implies that, sharing of credit 
information will lead to open ways of doing business and this will in turn help reduce the cost 
of doing business and hence lead to increased savings which will then reduce the level of 
nonperforming loans in the bank. 
European Scientific Journal    May 2013 edition vol.9, No.13    ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
185 
 
Effect of CRB on Nonperforming Loans 
 From the findings, 41 respondents representing 29% of the respondents from KCB 
who participated in the study indicated that CRB increases transparency among financial 
institutions, 34 respondents representing 23% of the respondents from KCB who participated 
in the study indicated that, it helps the banks lend prudently, 24 respondents representing 
21% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study said it lowered the risk level 
to the banks, 20 respondents representing 16% of the respondents from KCB who 
participated in the study said that, it acts as a borrowers discipline against defaulting, 16 of 
them representing 11% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study said that, 
it reduces the borrowing cost i.e. interest charge on loans. CRB has come of age and has 
helped many banks to lend with care. The effect of it therefore has led to reduced non-
performing loans as opposed to otherwise. Figure 4.2 indicates the results as below; 
 
Figure: Effect of CRB on nonperforming loans (Source Excel Computation) 
Trend of Bad Loans  
 From the audited financials of KCB from year 2007 to year 2012, the nonperforming 
loans represented 11% of the total loans in year 2007, it reduced by 2.09% to 9% of the total 
loans in year 2008 and it increased marginally in year 2009 by 1.22% to 10.22% of the total 
loans. In year 2010 the nonperforming loans decreased by 1.96% to 8.26% and in year 2011 
it reduced further by 3.07% to 5.19% of the total loans in year 2011. In year 2012, it 
marginally increased by 0.41% to 5.6% of the total loans in year 2012. Therefore, there is an 
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indication of reducing from 2008 to 2012, since the percentage in 2008 was 9.00% slightly 
rising to 10.22% in 2009, then reducing further to 8.26% in 2010, to 5.19% in 2011 and lastly 
to 5.60% in 2012. The amplification of this is that, CRB seems to have impacted positively 
on non-performing loans, hence the reduction. Therefore we can conclude that, the trend in 
the nonperforming loans at KCB has been reducing compared to the total volume of the loans 
in the bank which has been increasing in the past six years. 
Table Trend of nonperforming loans since year 2007 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Nonperforming 
loans '000 6,260,385 7,139,073 9,865,358 11,346,471 9,342,775 10,475,335 
Total loans '000 56,477,448 79,343,099 96,557,588 137,344,568 179,843,967 187,022,664 
Percentage of 
nonperforming 
loans 11.08 9.00 10.22 8.26 5.19 5.60 
Percentage 
increase/decrease 
 
(2.09) 1.22 (1.96) (3.07) 0.41 
Source: Audited Financial Statements for KCB (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) 
 
 
Figure Nonperforming loans from year 2007 to year 2012(Source: Audited Financial Statements for KCB 
(2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012)) 
 
 In absolute terms, the total nonperforming loans have increased from the year 2007 
which was Kes 6.26 Billion to Kes 10.5 Billion in year 2012. However, as a percentage to the 
total loan size the nonperforming loans have decreased.  
Situation before Credit Reference Bureau (CRB) 
 Most respondents 81, representing 54% of the respondents from KCB who 
participated in the study said that the situation before CRB came was better, followed by 
excellent 42 respondents representing 28% of the respondents from KCB who participated in 
the study and lastly worse 26 respondents representing 18% of the respondents from KCB 
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who participated in the study. This depicts a situation where, very few employees appreciate 
the work of CRB by the show of the respondents in the questionnaire given.  Majority of 
them thought that, the situation was better implying that, the lack of CRB would not change 
the situation anyway. There are very few who thing otherwise as it is indicated by the number 
of respondents saying and or agreeing to ‘worse’. 
Changes since CRB came into being 
 From the findings, 96 respondents representing 64.4% of the respondents from KCB 
who participated in the study said there were minimal changes since CRB came, 30 
respondents representing 20.1% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study 
of them said there were no changes, 22 respondents representing 14.8% of the respondents 
from KCB who participated in the study said there are changes and 1 respondent said is not 
aware. This implies that, CRB has done very little in terms of helping banks, especially KCB 
evaluate the loans given to customers. This is shown by the large number of respondents who 
said there were minimal changes. But nevertheless, there are a significant number of people 
who think CRB had benefited them, by giving them a good evaluation of the customers 
taking loans. 
Factors that account for bad loans 
 From the analysis, the main factors that lead to bad loans in most cases were said to 
be; lending to borrowers with questionable characters, serial loan defaulters, high interest 
rates that make it hard for some to pay, diversion of funds by borrowers from what they had 
intended to work on not being disclosed before the bank, lack of commitment by the 
borrower to pay the loan, poor planning by the borrowers of what and how they will use the 
loan for which exercise and last but not least lack of collateral for the bank. These causes 
make many borrowers not to pay their loans hence leading to many bad loans. This trend 
keeps on increasing due to lack of commitment from the Central bank of Kenya and or 
financial institutions to erase and address some of the said problems that lead to the rise in 
these cases. 
Economic Sector that has the highest loans 
 The economic sector that has the highest loans was found to be Asset Finance with 28 
respondents representing 18.8% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study, 
followed closely by Transport and Communication 27 respondents representing 18.1% of the 
respondents from KCB who participated in the study and then Motor Vehicle dealers 24 
respondents representing 16.1% of the respondents from KCB who participated in the study 
While the lowest were Retail Trade & Wholesale 5 respondents representing 3.4% of the 
respondents from KCB who participated in the study and Manufacturing (0).This shows that, 
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there is rapid growth in the Asset Finance and Transport and Communication Sectors giving 
rise to ownership of assets and properties in the country as shown in figure 4.5 below. On the 
other hand, there is significant rise in non-performing loans from these sectors implying that, 
there is a higher likelihood of loan non-payment from customers taking loans from these 
sectors. On the positive side, these could be attributed to many Kenyans and foreigners 
owning properties which in any case a good indication given that, it is one step in the right 
direction. 
 
Figure: Economic Sectors (Source:  Computation in Excel) 
Efforts to reduce the high risk in the economic sectors 
62 of the respondents, representing 42% of the respondents from KCB who 
participated in the study which was the highest, indicated that there was nothing being done, 
followed 35 respondents representing 23% of the respondents from KCB who participated in 
the study who indicated that ascertaining the credit worthiness using all available means like 
consulting other banks was the only way used to reducing the risk, then 33 of the respondents 
indicated that, they stopped advancing loans this sub-sector. The smallest numbers of 
respondents were 19 respondents who indicated that, they were getting information from 
CRB. 
Conclusion 
 The study concludes that credit information sharing and level of nonperforming loans 
are indeed related. Credit Information Sharing, increases transparency among financial 
institutions, helps the banks lend prudently, lowers the risk level to the banks, acts as a 
borrowers discipline against defaulting and it also reduces the borrowing cost i.e. interest 
charge on loans. CRB has come of age and has helped the bank to lend with care. The effect 
of it therefore has led to reduced non-performing loans. Finally, the study concludes that the 
trend of the nonperforming loans as a percentage of the total loans within KCB has improved 
in the last six years. The improvement is as a result of introduction of credit information 
sharing mechanism through CRB. 
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 The study concludes that as the economic sectors grows, the level of lending to these 
sectors will also increase and in return the level of nonperforming loans tends to increase as 
the sector grows. The increase in nonperforming loans in Asset Finance and transport and 
communication sector are in line with the current improved infrastructure in the country 
which attracts investors to asset financing, transport and communication sectors. The high 
bad loans could be as a result of many accidents in transport sector witnessed on our Kenyan 
roads and the slow refund by insurance companies for the asset financed vehicles involved in 
the accidents. The study also concludes that there is little being done to reduce lending to 
these high risk sectors. The management of the bank and central bank of Kenya seems not to 
be worried with the high bad loans in these subsectors. 
 The study further concludes that, the main factors that lead to bad loans in the bank 
are; lending to borrowers with questionable characters, serial loan defaulters, high interest 
rates that make it hard for some to pay, diversion of funds by borrowers. These causes make 
many borrowers not to honour their obligations hence leading to many nonperforming loans.  
Most of these factors are due to information asymmetry in the banking industry.  
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